Independent
March 8th
GM approval 'will be influenced by money
BY MARIE WOOLF
Chief Political Correspondent
AN ENVIRONMENTAL group criticised the Government yesterday after it emerged ministers could take into account finance as well as science in deciding whether GM crops can be grown commercially. Previously ministers have insisted that approval would be based solely on the scientific and environmental evaluation of farm trials.
Friends of the Earth-(FoE) accused the Government of trying to "skew the argument". Pete Riley, a spokesman, said he was worried the decision would be based on "a biased economic analysis".
FOE issued its warning after the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) said other factors, including "costs and benefits", would be considered. In a response to a select committee report on genetically modified organisms, Defra said a public debate on whether to approve planting will be steered by scientists rather than environmentalists, public health experts or consumer groups. The conclusions will be summarised for the Secretary of State for the Environment, Margaret Beckett.
Defra said: "The Government believes that public trust is vital to progress and innovation and that we must take note of people's concerns, but not exaggerate them."
The Prime Minister has ordered his strategy unit to produce a report on the economic benefits of GM crops. It is likely to argue that the benefits of commercialisation will be positive for "UK pic".
...........................................
The Weekly Standard, an influential US right wing magazine and in strong support of the Republicans, today printed an article against the US-Russia plutonium disposition program. The author was in the Department of Defense under Bush (the first) and was the one who stopped some US spent fuel from a closed nuclear plant in New York being shipped to Cogema for reprocessing.
Why is the U.S. government risking the spread of plutonium around the
world?
by Henry Sokolski
The Weekly Standard
10/21/2002, Volume 008, Issue 06
AFTER 9/11, keeping plutonium out of the hands of the world's Saddams and bin Ladens (who, with only 10 pounds of this reactor- generated stuff, could flatten lower Manhattan) would seem to be an urgent task. Tell that to the federal bureaucrats in charge of plutonium disposal. The programs they have proposed, if allowed to go forward, are not just leisurely, unnecessary, and expensive, they actually will increase the risks of nuclear theft.
What's their plan? It's part of a deal—the least attractive part—that the Clinton administration struck with Russia back in 2000. At that time, Washington and Moscow agreed that within two decades each would dispose of some 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium— enough to make over 13,000 Nagasaki-sized bombs. One way to do this—suggested in the agreement—was to mix this material with other radioactive waste to make it too dangerous to fool with. Another, which the Russians insisted upon, was to fashion the plutonium into reactor fuel and use it in nuclear power stations, again, to make it too hot radioactively to handle.
Both approaches are long-term solutions. In the near term, the surest way to keep this material from hostile hands is simply to strengthen security at the few sites where it is stored. This avoids the risk of illicit diversion that comes with additional transport or handling. Meanwhile, the classified hemispherical warhead shapes the plutonium is currently in could be made far less attractive for redeployment simply by smashing them flat at the storage sites. Later, after additional research is completed, one could mix this weapons material with other nuclear wastes and vitrify the stew into glass logs for final storage. This involves some risk because additional processing and transport is required. Once completed, however, this procedure would substantially reduce any chance of theft
Their most recent proposal has been to take in spent nuclear fuel from Asia and Europe and reprocess or chemically strip out the plutonium, which could then be turned into MOX reactor fuel. Minatom already has a commercial reprocessing plant and plenty of nuclear workers. There's only one problem: The plan is insanely unprofitable. Not only is MOX far more expensive than common uranium to use as reactor fuel, the Russians need $1 billion they don't have just to build a MOX fuel fabrication plant.
Henry Sokolski is executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy
Education Center in Washington, D.C., and author of "Best of
Intentions:America's Campaign Against Strategic Weapons Proliferation"
(Praeger, 2001).
under review
aims -
environment - membership - climate change -
alternatives - foe - identity cards
world comment2